And let’s not disregard the user, who now has an infected device. The advertisers will get hit with the resulting ad fraud from the infected devices. There are the ad exchanges who had their inventory access cut off while they battled the infection and will have had some publishers pull their inventory out permanently. You have the publisher who loses money directly from the interrupted user sessions, and loses future money from the increased ad blocking usage and user trust loss. The revenue impact of those 5 million malicious impressions needs to be measured from a multitude of different facets. Thanks Adam!īased on the volumes Confiant observed, at its peak the full scale of this specific attack triggered over 5 million times per day. The content for this report was collected via Google Chrome on Mac OS.Īll of the landing pages have been observed to force the download of a file named AdobeFlashPlayerInstaller.isoĪdam Thomas ( from Malwarebytes was kind enough to provide further analysis of the binary, which follows below. It’s unclear how many there are in total or how frequently they are rotated, as the campaigns themselves target specific platforms and messaging. Mixmaintenancegreatliteflash.icu mediafreshgreatliteflash.icu Landing pages for this campaign rotate through an eclectic collection of. The recent VeryMal campaign leveraged the following (still active) click tracker in their redirect chain in order to drop the fake Flash update: If so, execute the JavaScript located at:.Check if “WebKitPlaybackTargetAvailabilityEvent” exists in the Window object (a Safari targeting tactic).The simplicity is always better illustrated with a translation to english: Let’s look at the code: var wsw = '10512' var volton = '154c8e99-aad0-4658-b5fb-645c751ad42b' var canvas = document('iak') var ctx = canvas('2d') var image = new Image() image = '' image = ' ' var rs = '' var isSupportFontFamily = function (c)

The image alone will not harm your computer or redirect your browser.

In fact, the steganography comes into play in order to deliver only part of the payload, and the image needs to be processed in order for that piece to be extracted and then utilized. Validating the integrity of individual image files served in ads makes little sense within the broader context of the execution of these payloads. Much of the buzz around these types of attacks will have you believe that the image file alone is the threat and that we now have to fear the images that our browsers load during day to day web surfing, but this is a departure from the truth.

Steganography app for mac